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RAMON LULL'S 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL REALISM 
Like most mediaeval philosophers, Ramon Lull1 had no serious occa-
sion to undertake an explicitly or an exclusively epistemological treatise. 
This is not to say however, that he was unaware of epistemological ques-
tions or that he failed to have a set of clearly thought-out answers for 
many of them. As a matter of fact, both his attention to and resolution of 
some rather basic epistemological issues permit us to assert that his was a 
consciously critical epistemological attitude, one which moreover, can be 
reasonably reconstructed from the various places in his numerous writings 
where he explicitly addressed points of epistemological consequence or sig-
nificance. With as much practical recourse to the philosopher's words as 
may be possible in a brief communication, we shall attempt the recons-
truction in the ensuing pages. Not too surprisingly, such a reconstruction 
will establish rather clearly that on basic epistemological issues there was 
an essential agreement between Lull's philosophical system and those of 
most of the other great mediaeval thinkers of his century. 
Accordingly, it is well to note at the outset that Lull's epistemological 
posture was decidedly non-skeptical. Even a cursory acquaintance with his 
multi-faceted thought and writings suffices to show that, had the philoso-
pher been asked about it he would have expressed little, if any, sympathy 
for the type of thought associated with universal or total skepticism, with 
its notion that men are not capable of arriving at any truth, speculative or 
practical, with a reasonably well-founded certainty. 2 It has to be said even 
that he would have rejected and opposed forcefully any of the seemingly 
1 For an English biography see Edgar Allison Pcers, Ramon Lull - A Biography (London: Society 
for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1929). Lull's oldest biography was written five years before his 
death, probably right after he told it to friends in religious life. The original text has been critically 
edited as the Vita coaetanea by Hermogenes Harada in ROL VIII (1980), 269-309. 
2 R. F. 0'Neill, The Theories of Knowledge, Englewoods Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1961, pp. 125-
8. 
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limited kinds of skepticism which declare, or implicitly assert, that one or 
more of man's natural cognitive powers are in principle ineffective or de-
fective so that consequently, man cannot come to know the truth naturally 
and with certainty. Had Lull been disposed or inclined towards skepticism, 
even a limited type of it, in a serious way; had he, in other words, 
thought that at least one of man's natural cognitive powers is totally inef-
fective or defective in principle, he would never have written books as The 
Tree of Knowledge2, and The Art of Finding Truth,4 except as complete 
literary fabrications and fictions. Nor would he have applied himself mo-
reover, during the span of many years to the laborious task of writing no 
less than thirty books, many of them of a rather respectable size, with the 
exclusive intent of developing, explaining and revising the basic principles, 
methods and rules of an Art which he discovered, or invented, to facilitate 
the search and the discovery of truths in most, if not all, areas of human 
discourse.5 In the prologue of an Ars Amativa Boni6 -whose title indicates 
the author's concern in it not with truth and science directly but with the 
good and the art of loving it, amantia as he calls it- Lull declares in very 
clear terms that, although to succeed in the attainment of this goal requi-
res much effort and discipline, yet to discover and to give birth to the 
truth is an enterprise naturally akin to and in perfect harmony with the 
nature of man's intellect.7 The raison d'etre and the chief purpose there-
fore, of man's distinctive and highest noetic power, the intellect or reason, 
is to enable us to understand and to know well. To be without the know-
ledge by means of the intellect that we could and should have is really 
indicative of a deviation of that power from what is a most natural and 
the chief purpose of its being. 8 A similar but less serious turning aside 
from a natural task occurs when a person chooses without reason to close 
his eyes or ears with the intent of neither seeing nor hearing things which 
3 Written in Catalan with the title Arbre de ciencia, it may be read in OE I, 547-1046. 
4 Ars inventiva veritatis in Latin; it may be read in MOG V (1729), 1-210. Lull composed at least 
two other books with simiiar titles: Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem in MOG I, 433-481 = Int. vii 
and Lectura Arlis inventivae et Tabulae generalis in MOG V, 359-715 = Int. v. 
5 The major moments in the evolution of the Arl and its major revisions in the order of composi-
tion are marked by the a) Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem; b) Ars demonstrativa, MOG III, 93-204 
= Int. iii; c) Ars inventiva veritatis; d) Tabula generalis, MOG V, 221-300 = Int. ii; e) Ars generalis 
ultima, ed. Francis Marcal (Palma-Majorca: Gabriel Guasp, 1645). 
6 This Ars may be read in MOG VI, 7-158 = Int. ii of the Mainz edition. 
7 "... Iste intellectus est liber in hoc quod intclligit, ... tamen est constrictus ... tamen tahs constric-
tio non est contra suam naturam nec contra suam libertatem ... cum illi sit naturale parere veritatem". 
Lull, Ars amativa boni prol., in MOG VI, 8 = Int. ii, 2. Also: "Anima est, ut sit scientia, cum qua 
homo habeat cognitionem praesentium, praeteritorum et futurorum". Lull, Liber de Anima rationali, 
part 4, MOG VI, 444 = Int. vii, 30. 
8 "Finis intellectus est intelligere, et quando ignorat, ejus discursus est deviatus a fine, propter 
quem est". Liber de anima ralionali part 3, MOG VI, 436 = Int. vii, 22. 
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he or she ought to hear. 9 Consequently, since the main business and end 
of the intellect is to bring us to the truth, then to see to it that with our 
understanding we acquire all appropriate and true knowledge within our 
reach is a serious duty, one incumbent upon us, as it were, because of our 
possession of a rational soul. 1 0 
A reflection of a definite non-skeptical frame of mind was LulFs cons-
cious and solid assurance that each one of us is in possession of a number 
of truths, and this with at least an implicit and reasonably unshakable cer-
tainty. For instance, each one of us has the certainty of his or her existen-
ce beyond possible reasonable doubt. Without appealing to the indubitabi-
lity of one's own existence, as had been done by St. Augustine against the 
skeptics nine centuries earlier and as would be done again by Descartes 
more than three centuries later, at the outset almost of his literary career 
Lull simply but forcefully recalled it as an occasion worthy of the great-
est rejoicing before the creator, on account of the possession, awareness 
and certainty of our being. 1 1 By the actions that spring from them, as 
their immediate principle, even our sensory knowing powers reveal and 
manifest to us our existence in an undeniable manner. 1 2 How else may 
one account for and make sense of this acts of seeing, hearing, tasting, 
smelling and feeling? At a later occasion and in a later writing Lull noted 
emphatically that we are certain not only of our existence, but that we 
also have or can easily have a certain amount of positive and negative 
knowledge of what our soul is and is not, as well as of how we ought to 
live and act in order to lead the kind of moral existence suitable to ration-
al creatures. 1 3 
Man's actual possession of truths is not limited to those which have to 
do with himself only. With likewise unshakable certainty and on the solid 
basis of personal experience, in which our sense powers have played and 
continue to play an indispensable and primary role, we also know that ma-
terial and corporeal substances are in existence. 1 4 It is by means of the 
9 "... sicut homo agit contra finem ipsius videre, quartdo claudit oculos, et contra fincm ipsius audi-
re, quando obstruit aures". Loc. cit. 
1 0 "Anima est de fine suorum principiorum et potentiarum, quia... et propter hoc est obligata ad 
tractandum, quod illa principia veniant ad suum finem, scilicet... intellectus ad intelligendum". Ibid., 
part 3, MOG VI, 439 = Int. vii, 25. 
" "... nos, qui sumus certi, quod simus in esse". Liber contemplationis in Dewn, c. 2:1, MOG IX 
(1740), 5. 
1 2 "Nam quinque sensus demonstrant esse, in quo sumus. quia oculis videmus, et auribus audimus. 
et naribus odoramur, et ore gustamus, et carne scntimus". Loc. cit. 
1 3 "... nam in hoc, quod homo habet cognitionem illius, de quo anima est, et illius, de quo anima 
non est, habet homo cognitionem animae, et potest habere doctrinam ad ordinandum animam ad bonos 
mores". Liber de anima rationali, part 3, MOG VI, 438 = Int. vii, 24. 
1 4 "Per experientiam scimus, quod sint corporales substantiae, quia ipsas sentimus per videre et 
tangere et per alios sensus: sicut lapis, qui est visibilis et tangibilis et sic de aliis substantiis". lbid., part 
1, MOG VI, 417 = Int. vii, 3. 
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powers of sight and of touch that we actually experience much of the re-
ality of many of the numerous bodily entities which collectively constitute 
what we rightly and ordinarily designate as the material and visible univer-
se. 
The repeated Lullian efforts in many works to outline, explain and 
develop demonstrations or rational proofs for the existence of the ontolo-
gically First and Supreme Being show ciearly that the Majorcan philoso-
pher did not consider the human mind's power to discover the truth as 
limited to the two following types simply: a) the truth of our existence and 
the knowledge of the content within our minds; b) and truths about what 
we may be able to experience directly with our bodily senses. Through the 
instrumentality of our rational and intellectual power of knowing we are 
further capable of establishing firmly truths which bear on an immaterial 
and spiritual realm generally and, more importantly and particularly, on 
the reality of an infinite and divine First Being. 1 5 
At the same time that Lull upheld against all types of skepticism the 
naturalness of knowledge and of truth for the human intellect, as well as 
its actual and possible possession, with certainty, of an amount of very 
significant knowledge and of a number of fundamental truths, he wisely 
avoided the twin errors of looking upon the human reason as a) a power 
exhaustive of all truth and b) a power creative of the truth within our 
minds. For him to avoid such epistemological errors was not difficult be-
cause he recognized first of all, the finite character of the human intel-
lect 1 6 and secondly, because he realized well that in its knowledge of re-
ality by means of species, or the similitudes of things known required by 
the embodied condition of the human intellect, our mind or reason cannot 
receive and judge within itself perfectly the objects it knows. The reason 
is that the human intellect in our present existence cannot, in and through 
knowledge, come close to exhausting the rich essential and non-essential 
entitative reality of the objects made present to it in knowledge. 1 7 
It is therefore clear that Lull was a conscious dogmatist, although ad-
mittedly he never described himself as one in those terms. Yet he expli-
citly acknowledged man's capacity, by reason of a natural endowment of 
our noetic powers, to arrive at the certain knowledge of basic and signifi-
cant truths, as well as possibly of others. Moreover, what has heretofore 
1 5 For some idea of Lul!'s repeated efforts to prove God's existence in many of his writings see W. 
Artus, "Ramon Lull, The Metaphysician", Anlonianum 56 (1981), p. 723, n. 23. 
1 6 "Quoniam nos sumus finiti ... non est rationabiie, quod noster intellectus velit transire ultra ter-
minum,- in quo illum fecisti esse finitum et terminatum". Liber conlemplationis, c. 5:4, MOG IX, 10. 
1 7 "... nec tamen ratio potest attingere tantum realitatis, quantum est in objecto: igitur isto modo 
deficit ratio, quia non potest tantum judicare de objecto, quantum objectum est". Lull, Ramon, Quaes-
tiones per Artem demonstrativam seu inventivam solubiles, q. 78, MOG IV, 116 = Int. iii, 100. 
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been indicated also clearly shows that the Majorcan philosopher was a 
conscious epistemological realist. 
He was rightly convinced first of all that neither ourselves nor the ob-
jects of everyday experiences are simply ideas within the wisdom and 
mind of the Supreme Being. Indeed, God has a perfect and eternal know-
ledge of each one of us and of all other things which are not the Divine 
Reality. But on the other hand, the idea of ourselves within the wisdom 
of God is not our real selves, entitatively speaking. 1 8 God's knowledge of 
each and all things which are other than Himself is one with and identical 
with His essence and being. Finite and contingent as is the reality of each 
one of us who is not the First being, we are not and can never be one 
with His infinite essence, nor even a part of i t . 1 9 In a more explicit and 
direct manifestation of his epistemological realism, the Majorcan philoso-
pher saw clearly that not only are the real things, of which we have expe-
riential knowledge, extramental and separate from our minds in their enti-
tative structure and reality, but also that through our knowledge, in those 
instances when it is directly experiential, we reach outside and beyond the 
content present within our minds. Consequently we know many of the ob-
jects of possible experience, directly in their actual reality and by their 
very presence. 2 0 We do indeed cognitively grasp our existence, with cer-
tainty as we have seen, as well as something of what we are and of our 
actions. But it is obvious that neither our existence nor our nature nor our 
actions are the mere contents of and within someone's consciousness, be it 
our own or semeone else's. Moreover, when it is a question of the reality 
and existence of the many physical objects which collectively make up the 
material world, it is both a fact and a truth unequivocally asserted by Lull 
that we can and do know many bodily substances directly, through and in 
our manifold sensory-intellectual experiences of them. 2 1 Not once did he 
speak or write of man seeing, hearing or touching sensations or simply the 
ideas of colors, sounds and other physical features possibly possessed by 
possibly existing corporeal substances of the world. On the contrary very 
1 8 "Anima Martini, in quantum est idea, est Deus ... et in quantum illa idea est differens ab anima 
Martini, anima non est de essentia ideae, sed est de suis propriis principiis". Liber de anima rationali, 
part 3, MOG VI, 438 = Int. vii, 24. 
1 9 See W. Artus, "La creacibn, sefial de la filosofia luliana", EL 17 (1973), 132-163, pp. 149, 156-
57. 
2 0 "Per experientiam scimus, quod sint corporales substantias, quia ipsas sentimus per videre et tan-
gere et per alios sensus..." Liber de anima rationali, part 1, MOG VI, 417 = Int. vii, 3. Also: "Anima 
est substantia, quae indiget organo, cum quo attingat scientiam objectorum corporalium; sicut ad attin-
gendum colorem, ad quem indiget oculis et potentia sentiendi..." lbid., part 2, MOG VI, 425 = Int. vii, 
11. 
2 1 "Per experientiam scimus, quod sint corporales substantias, quia ipsas sentimus per videre et tan-
gere et per alios sensus..." Ibid., part 1, MOG VI, 417= Int. vii, 3. 
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clearly he wrote to the effect that sight, hearing, taste, smell and touch 
are powers by means of which colors, sounds, flavors, etc. are seized and 
attained by us directly and in the first instance. 2 2 Indeed, it is precisely in 
order to insure the direct experiential knowledge of at least some of the 
properties and reality of the physical substances of the world that the hu-
man soul is substantially united with, and has a need of, a body with its 
many organs, such as eyes for seeing colors, ears to hear sounds, e tc . 2 3 
An essential element deteetable in LulFs realism was his clear aware-
ness and grasp of the distinction between on the one hand, the order of 
being and on the other, the order of knowledge, although obviously there 
is a relation between them. On at least one occasion he speaks of the 
"modus essendi" and of the "modus intelligendi", with the latter clearly in 
the subsidiary position. 2 4 Practically at the start of his writing career, he 
made it clear that he was more than sufficiently aware that we may state, 
correctly and meaningfully, that things are or exist a) in reality and b) as 
well as in knowledge. Thinking of things which are entitatively other than 
God, he expressed himself in these terms: "We know that the being of 
creatures is given in three distinct modes: first, one wherein creatures exist 
within God's wisdom; the second one wherein they are formally in the 
soul. in the intellect which knows them, that is; the third one wherein 
they are in themselves". 2 5 Doubtlessly the being possessed by things 
through or in their being within someone's soul, i.e. within the intel-
lect or other knowing powers by means of which they are seized in knowl-
edge, is profoundly different and diverse from the entitative being which is 
theirs insofar as they exist separately in themselves, i.e. extramentally or, 
in a phrase utilized by Lull, "in re, extra vocem et etiam extra animam." 2 6 
The distinction in question more than justifies the various types of science 
2 2 "Visus est illa potentia, quae primo attingit colorem... Auditus est illa potentia, quae sentit so-
num..." Lull, Liber proverbiorum, part 3, cc. 57-61, in MOG VI, pp. 395-6 = Int. vi, 113-114. 
2 3 "Anima est substantia, quae indiget organo, cum quo attingat scientiam objectorum corpora-
lium". Liber de anima rationali. part 2, MOG VI, 425 = Int. vii, 11. 
"Cum sit differentia inter modum essendi rei et modum eam intelligendi, considerandum est, qua 
ratione procedit medium conclusionis... Si autem accidat inevitabilis contrarietas inter illos (quae patet 
in punctis transcendentibus) concludendum est necessario per modum essendi..." Lull, Ramon, Ars in-
ventiva veritatis, d. 2, reg. 2, in MOG V, 38. Cp. "Per realitatem intendimus considerare entitatem rei 
consideratae; per rationem intendimus considerare similitudinem et conceptum, quem facit anima ratio-
nalis, tunc, quando considerat realitatem rerum per illarum similitudines". Lull, Ars amativa, d. 2, reg. 
5, MOG VI, 21 = Int. ii, 15. 
2 5 "Notum est, quod esse creaturarum sit in tribus modis: unus est, quod omnes creaturae sint in 
sapientia Dei: alter est, quod sint formaliter in anima, hoc est, in intellectu, qui illas intelligit; tertius 
cst, quod sint in se ipsis". Lull, Liber mirandarum demonstrationum, I, c. 12, in MOG II 182 = Int. v, 
6. 
2 6 Lull, Liber de multiplicatione, quae fit in essentia Dei, per divinam trinitatem, ROL II, 139. 
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that we have. Many bodies of scientific knowledge, with metaphysics at 
the head, investigate and provide us with information about the entities 
and things "quae sunt extra animam". 2 7 We also have the disciplines we 
speak of collectively as logic. In them we investigate objects or things con-
sidered only "secundum esse, quod habent in anima". 2 8 Yet, when all is 
said and done, it cannot be gainsaid that a vast difference obtains between 
the real or extramental way of being which belongs to all the entities 
which exist realiter in themselves and the intentional or mental way of 
being, which may also belong to the same things and others by the fact 
that they are known. Unlike the later empiricist and idealist thinker, Ber-
keley, who declared the esse and percipi of material bodies identical, Lull 
never confused the modus essendi rei and the modus intelligendi. In addi-
tion he noted clearly that the entitative being of real things is and shall 
always remain the correct basis for the speculative mode of knowing, since 
it is the function of the latter to enable knowers to assimilate within them-
selves, through knowledge, the structure and character of what is real, as 
accurately and perfectly as humanly possible. 2 9 Whereas the modus essendi 
rei is actually constituted and brought about by interior entitative princi-
ples, substantial and accidental within each thing, the modus intelligendi in 
most cases results from, or better is one with, the species or similitudes of 
things abstracted and drawn from the experienced things in the world. 3 0 It 
is through those species, now united with our various knowing powers, 
that the real things become intentionally present to ouf senses and imagi-
nation first and then, to our intellective power. 3 1 
2 7 "Metaphysica enim considerat res, quae sunt extra animam, prout conveniunt in ratione entis". 
Introductoria Artis demonstrativae, MOG III, 55 = Int. ii, 1. 
2 8 "Logica autem considerat res secundum esse, quod habent in anima, quia tractat de quibusdam 
intentionibus, quae consequuntur esse rerum intelligibilium..." Loc. cit. 
2 9 "Unde cum modus intelligendi ad modum essendi rei dirigatur, quantum potest, tanquam ad tcr-
minum ad quem, ut ipse modus essendi per modum intelligendi attingatur, formanda est major propor-
tio et concordantia inter utrumque modum, et contrarietas inter eos (ut melius poterit) evitanda. Si 
autem accidat inevitabilis contrarietas... concludendum est necessario per modum essendi". Ars invenli-
va, d. 2, reg. 2, MOG V, 38. 
3 0 "Est autem modus essendi rei per sua propria principia et in suis necessariis principiis substantia-
libus et accidentalibus, sine quibus ipsa res esse non potest, seu per quae et de quibus ipsa res ad 
perfectum esse deducta est... Modus vero intelligendi sunt ipsae similitudines modi essendi per sensum 
et imaginationem, aut quandoque sine sensu et imaginatione ab intellectu abstractae". Loc. cit. 
3 1 "Anima habet objecta ad extra in objectis ad intra". Liber de anima ralionali MOG VI, 433 = 
Int. vii, 19. "Nullum objectum, quod non est conjunctum cum anima, potest esse intra animam realiter: 
sicut asinus, qui non est intra animam, quac intelligit asinum; sed similitudo illius asini est species, quam 
intellectus intelligit, in qua ita intelligit asinum..." lbid., part 8, MOG VI, 462 = Int. vii, 48. "Anima 
habet in imaginativa similitudines vel species secundariorum objectorum... et ponit ejus similitudinem ad 
intra in intelligere, quando in abstracto intelligit speciem plantae vel..." Ibid., part 2, MOG VI, 432 = 
Int. vii, 18 "... in via anima nunquam potest intelligere remotum intelligibile sine vel sensuali vel intel-
lectuale phantasmate..." Quaestiones per Artem, q. 78, MOG IV, 107 = Int. iii, 91. 
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Obviously therefore, the thirteenth century Majorcan Lull was a re-
alist, one who unabashedly but rationally affirmed the extramental reality, 
not exclusively of course, of the physical things of the world, for they are 
ontologically other than and distinct from a) our awareness of them and b) 
the knowing powers by means of which we are aware of them. The mate-
rial or physical objects of our everyday experience and an innumerable 
quantity of others are entia realia. As such, and particularly in the being 
which they possess entitatively, they are profoundly distinct from all entia 
phantastica32 which, in their turn as such, have no more than what is an 
esse in anima, hoc est in intellectu. A more significant element of the Lul-
lian epistemological realism is that it correctly acknowledged that in most 
instances when we execute acts of knowledge, specifically those which ac-
tively involve our senses, we are in some way and with certainty, receiving 
information about the real things of the world. But as students of modern 
philosophy know well today, a sound and complete realism must go fur-
ther. Descartes and Locke accepted the extramental existence of the world 
of reality, explicitly that of the physical or material universe. Both think-
ers also thought that the physical and extended substances of the world 
are distinct and entitatively separate from our minds, as well as from the 
thoughts or ideas of them. They also acknowledged that through at least 
some of the thoughts or ideas which we obviously seem to have of the 
things in the world we are, within limits, correctly informed about the 
things they agreed exist extramentally. Nevertheless both of them again, 
as well as their recent followers and successors, declare, rather unequivo-
cally, that the immediate and direct object of our knowing powers, and 
consequently of knowledge itself, is our thoughts or ideas, and not the 
things themselves which make up the world. Appropriately as a result, 
Descartes' and Locke's realism has been characterized a "Representative 
Realism" since, according to both, what men know directly and immedia-
tely is the representations of things. This is what our ideas are, at least 
many of those that seem to make us aware of the corporeal substances in 
the world, as well as of their properties. 3 3 
Very different is the immediate realism 3 4 explicitly, or at least impli-
citly, present in the thought of most mediaeval philosophers. For them 
and for Lull who was one of them, the immediate object of particularly 
3 2 "Ens reale est illud, a quo humanus intellectus abstrahit similitudines... Istud ens, fili, dicitur 
reale, quia existit in seipso; et quamvis humanus intellectus non esset, ipsum remaneret in se ipso hoc, 
quod est... Ens phantasticum est illud, quod humanus intellectus multiplicat et componit de speciebus, 
in quibus attingit veritatem entium. Hoc ens, fili, non esset, nisi humanus intellectus esset hoc, quod 
est". Lull, Arbor philosophiae desideratae, d. I, part 1, in MOG, VI, 248 = Int. v, 8. 
3 3 0'Neill, op cit., p. 191. Also John Pfeifer, The Mystery of Knowledge, (Albany: Magi Books, 
1964), pp. 14-15. 
3 4 For a brief account of this realism in St. Thomas Aquinas see Pfeifer, op. cit., pp. 29-33. 
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our experiential sensory intellectual knowledge is given in reality itself, in 
the individual physical beings or things of the world in which we live, not 
in the thoughts or ideas which we may and do often have of them, within 
our minds. The real objects or things themselves, not the ideas in which 
and by which they become present to us within our knowing powers, are 
the direct object of our knowledge. What men in most cases attend to, 
what they deal with, when they perform acts of knowledge, particularly 
and certainly the experiential ones, are the entia realia which have exis-
tence extra animam. This of course is not the case in the instances in 
which minds construct entia rationis, mental beings and constructs to which 
Lull gave the designation "entia phantastica". On the numerous occasions 
when we actually experience and know directly the real objects or entities 
in the physical world, our cognitive powers, both sensory and intellectual 
ones, receive within themselves, intentionally or spiritually, some of the 
physical characteristics and something of the intelligible entitative structure 
which are really present in the things we perceive and understand. By way 
of the cognitional acts of the various external senses of sight, hearing, tas-
te, smell and touch we actually seize, intentionally of course, the colors, 
sounds, flavors, shapes and other physical features of objects in the world 
which are visible, audible, tangible, etc. 3 5 Far from finding itself locked in 
total isolation within itself, and without any contact with what is outside of 
itself in the rest of the world of reality, our soul by reason of its sensory 
noetic powers is in a very real sense actively passive and receptive of exte-
rior physical objects when, with those powers, it actively and directly per-
ceives their colors, sounds, shapes and other physical properties. 3 6 Those 
accidental features of the exterior things are actively received by the 
knower from outside itself,37 immaterially and intentionally, not entitati-
vely of course. Obviously, a power such as sight, with the bodily organ it 
informs, cannot actually seize or see a color or a shape which is not out 
there in an object before it. Nor can one actually hear sounds and noises 
which have neither occurred nor been produced by some object in the 
world. 3 8 In our sensory cognitive experiences there is, therefore, an 
3 5 "... in homine potentiam sensitivam, per quam homo habet quinque sensus sensuales, hoc est, 
auditum, visum... nam per auditum audit loquelas et voces... per visum habet cognitionem de diversita-
tibus formarum et colorum... per tactum habet cognitionem de rebus tangibilibus..." Liber conlemplatio-
nis, c. 41:1, MOG IX, 86. 
"Anima habet passiones cum objectis extrinsecis; sicut per colorem, vel per sonum, vel per pul-
chritudinem foeminae, vel per bonum saporem vini et pomi". Liber de anima rationali, Part 10, MOG 
VI, 473 = Int. vii, 59. 
3 7 "Cristallum positum supra subjectum coloratum accipit similitudinem a colore subjecti... idem 
sequitur de quinque corporahbus sensibus; veluti oculi, qui realiter accipiunt figuras a substantiis, et 
similitudines, quas speculum accipit a rebus ab extra". Lull, Ars amativa, d. 2, reg. 5, MOG VI, 21 = 
Int. ii, 15. 
3 8 "... nam sicut oculi non possunt videre sine colore, nec aures audire sine sono..." Liber de anima 
rationali, Part 7, MOG VI, 457 = Int. vii, 43. 
138 WALTER W. ARTUS 
authentic, though immaterial and intentional, reception of one or more of 
the sensible accidents really possessed by the objects which our senses per-
ceive. Of course neither the physical objects themselves nor their real pro-
perties can enter and be received within the soul, or its powers, in their 
entitative existence. 3 9 On that account it is necessary to say that known 
objects become present to our minds through or in some intentional simili-
tudes of the species, or forms, actually present in the objects. 4 0 By reason 
of their ontological or entitative reality, which is physical also in the case 
of the material and sensible things of the world, the real things a knower 
knows must remain separate from, and outside, the knowing power whe-
reby he knows them. The things themselves cannot enter into the power 
or the soul realiter. Nevertheless, the knower takes them in through or by 
means of their intentional similitudes or species, wherein and whereby 
they can and do become present to the knower as knower. 4 1 Intentionally 
and immaterially therefore, the soul of a knower has within itself the ob-
jects which he knows, although they remain other than, and outside of, 
itself realiter. By means of and in species abstracted from the objects 
themselves, these are placed finally within the power of the intellect 
known as the possible intellect, wherein at last the potentially intelligible 
objects of the material world are actually known and understood, in some 
measure at least. 4 2 
Our last statement and a few others before it reflect an understanding 
of human knowledge which human experience bears out, namely that 
man's knowledge is not simply a matter of sensations, no matter how reo-
fined. In contrast to the incipient and imperfect knowledge rightly associa-
ted with brute animals, human knowledge is more perfectly and more 
completely achieved through understanding or intellectual knowledge. 
Even our contact with the physical entities found extra animam et etiam 
extra vocem extends past and beyond physical accidental characteristics to 
their interior entitative essence and to other intelligible features. AU 
" "Nullum objectum, quod non est conjuntum cum anima, potest esse intra animam realiter: sicut 
asinus, qui non est intra animam, quae intelligit asinum; sed similitudo illius asini..." Ibid., part 8, 
MOG VI 462 = Int. vii, 48. 
4 0 "... sed similitudo illius asini est species, quam intellectus intelligit, in qua ita intelligit asinum, 
sicut homo qui videt suam faciem in speculo; et illam speciem comprehendit intellectus..." Loc. cil. 
4 1 "Anima est substantia spiritualis, quae per speciem attingit objecta quae accipit; sicut mater, 
quae memorat filium quem non videt,.." Ibid., part 2, MQG.VI, 425 = Int. vii, 11. "Anima habet in se 
ipsa objecta, quae, capit, sicut Martinus, qui intelligit suum filium vel alium absentem a sensu; et ideo 
potentiae non exeunt extra substantiam, quando capiunt objecta, sed de substantiis ad extra colligunt 
illa, et ponunt illa ad intra, capiendo de substantiis ab extra earum similitudines, et convertendo illas in 
substantias ad intra". Ibid., part 2, MOG VI, 428 = Int. vii, 14. 
4 2 "Anima etiam habet in se ipsa partes activas et passivas: ...habet potentias passivas, in quantum 
in illis potest ponere impressiones et similitudines aliarum substantiarum... et ille intellectus intelligibilis 
est possibilis". Loc. cit. 
RAMON LULl/S EPISTEMOLOGICAL REALISM 139 
extramentally existing real things are fundamentally intelligible4 3 precisely 
because they are possessed of being and existence. In principle therefore, 
all of them can actually be understood and known intellectually, at least to 
some extent, by entities possessed of an intellect, such as men are. This at 
least is the understanding of man's cognitional situation explicitly held by 
Lull and present in his writings. With what has previously been indicated, 
it makes it quite clear that, like most of his contemporary philosophical 
colleagues, Lull merits to be identified as a moderate intellectual realist. 4 4 
According to him, as for most of them, our cognitive contact with the 
world of our everyday experience is not achieved or realized by means 
simply of our senses, indispensable as these are for both our initial and 
our direct knowledge of the sensible things of the world. Man has been 
endowed with an intellect and a reasoning power which permit him to 
arrive at a knowledge of the truth about the physical realities of the world 
in its full sense of the word, as well as to some knowledge about what is 
other than the material universe. Man's intellect however, is not a power 
which is either infallible or all-knowing. Nor is it ordinarily capable of co-
ming by much of its acquired knowledge, at least initially, except it be 
served or ministered faithfully and constantly by the humbler sensory cog-
nitive powers and by our imagination. 4 5 Lull understood clearly that man's 
complete cognitive nature comprises, in addition to the intellect, the pow-
ers of external sensation and of the imagination which are also present in 
animals. But he did not fail to see with undiluted clarity that what distin-
guishes man specifically from all the brute animals is the possession of ra-
tional powers, one of the most important ones being the power of the in-
tellect or the human reason. This intellectual and rational cognitive power 
is not just a little different and higher in degree than the sensory powers 
and the imagination. Rather it is specifically distinct and superior because 
it is truly spiritual. Of the various noetic powers possessed by humans it is 
the highest and the noblest. 4 6 For whereas with the senses and the imagi-
"... et extra sunt multae intelligibilitates, quae non sunt de essentia intellectus; sicut intelligibilitas 
ignis et sui caloris, plantae et sui coloris, equi et sui videre, et sic de aliis intelligibilitatibus similibus 
istis; et omnes istae intelligibilitates sunt passiones dispositae ad esse passivae sub intellectivo intrinseco; 
et quia sunt de uno genere intelligibilitatis cum intelligibilitate intrinseca..." Ibid., part 10, MOG VI, 
471 = Int. vii, 57. 
4 4 St. Thomas Aquinas is so described. See Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy, tr. E. 
I. Watkins (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1962), pp. 130-31. 
4 5 "In quantum anima non potest habere suas operationes ad intra sine multiplicatione specierum ad 
extra convenit, quod extra habeat passiones, quas imprimat intra: sicut passionem per videre vel per 
alium sensum impressam in imaginatione, et de imaginationc in intclligibilitate ad intra, in qua intellecti-
vum intelligit..." Liber de anima rationali, part 9, MOG VI, 467 = Int. vii. 
4 6 "... quia nobilitasti potentiam rationativam super omnes alias potentias in hoc, quod eam facias 
esse dominam ipsarum, cum facias eam dominam imaginativae, quac cst domina sensitivae". Liber con-
templationis, c. 43, n. 4, MOG IX, 91. 
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4 7 "... ordinasti, quod potentia rationativa figuret et inquirat rem: utrum sit, vel non sit in esse; et, 
si inveniat, quod sit in esse, inquirat causam, quare est, et, si inveniat, quod res non sit in esse, inquirat 
causam, quare non est; et si inveniat, quod res sit in esse, inquirat, quid sit et qualis sit..." lbid., c. 
43:9, MOG IX, 92. 
4 8 "Homo est substantia constituta ex anima rationali et corpore elementato, vegetato, sensato et 
imaginato... et quando contingit, quod homo non sit homo, ipse desinit esse propter separationum sua-
rum partium... sic homo perseverat esse homo per compositionem et propinquitatem suarum partium". 
Liber de homine, part 3, MOG VI, 484 = Int. viii, 10. 
4 9 "...est differentia inter angelum et animam... secundum modum agentiae; ... anima accipit species 
extrinsecas per sensum, et de sensu transmittit illas in imaginationem, et de imaginatione ponit illas in se 
ipsa, quae sunt similitudines substantiarum corporalium; et quando illas accipit in se ipsa, facit illas spiri-
tuales... denudatas corporalitate". Liber de anima ralionali, MOG VI, 465-6 = Int. vii, 51-2. Read aiso: 
"...sicut speculum sensuale repraesentat, et demonstrat figuras sibi praesentes, ita res sensuales sunt sca-
la et demonstratio, per quem homo ascendit ad percipiendum res intellectuales". Liber contemplalionis, 
c. 169:1, MOG IX, 392. 
5 0 See note 45 above. 
5 1 "... et de imaginatione ponit illas in se ipsa, quae sunt similitudines substantiarum corporalium; et 
quando illas accipit in se ipsa, facit illas spirituales, et transmutat illas de imaginalitate in spiritualitatem, 
denudates corporalitate". Liber de anima rationali, part 9, MOG VI, 466 = Int. vii, 52. 
nation men seize and know the size, shapes, colors, sounds and other 
physical properties of the objects around them, with the intellect they can 
apprehend what belongs to their inner authentic being, as well as other 
intelligible features which may belong to them and other things. By means 
of their understanding men can really determine and know whether things 
are or are not. By means of it they can also grasp something of what they 
are and of their causes. 4 7 These and other intelligible factors can be 
known by man, and by him alone on this earth, because he has been en-
dowed with the power of the intellect. 
In order to complete the epistemological picture of Lull as a modera-
te intellectual realist, it only needs to be added that he recognized that, 
although man has a variety of knowing powers which fundamentally are 
neither the body nor its organs, the human existent and person is not his 
soul alone. 4 8 For that reason and on that account one must acknowledge 
that human beings have an indispensable need, at least in their present 
existence, of the sensory knowing powers with their bodily organs, even 
for the acquisition and development of their distinctively rational or intel-
lectual knowledge. 4 9 It is true that men carry out the actual acts of un-
derstanding properly with their intellects alone. But yet they cannot natu-
rally and normally exercise those acts unless the senses first provide the 
intellect, via the imagination, with the species of corporeal substances 
which, really present, acted originally on the senses. 5 0 Since the intentio-
nal species received by the senses and passed on to the imagination are 
sensible in their representative character, the intellect has to immaterialize 
and spiritualize them before it can receive them. 5 1 It accomplished this by 
an abstraction which it effects on the species presented to it by and within 
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the imagination. The result is that the intelligible entitative structure and 
other intelligible features, potentially intelligible in the sensible species 
within the imagination, are rendered actually intelligible and become ac-
tually understood by and within the intellect. 
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